Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for including

me in these hearings and, perhaps more important, thank you

for holding these hearings. It sometimes takes longer than we

would wish to see policies adopted and, even when they are adopted

and become the law of the land, it sometimes takes much longer

than we wish to see them implemented. That clearly is the situation

we are now in with respect to the Iraq Liberation Act and the

repeated expression by the Congress in both Houses in support of

the strategy for the liberation of Iraq—a strategy very different

from the one that now constitutes administration policy.

The word ‘‘policy’’ is probably an overstatement in describing the

administrations attitude toward Iraq. Paralysis is probably more

appropriate. The administration describes its policy as one of containment,

and on any number of occasions administration spokesmen

have expressed their satisfaction at a policy that has kept

Saddam, as they sometimes put it, in a box, powerless, ineffective,

unable to act.

The evidence, however, is overwhelming that during the lifetime

of this administration Saddam’s regime has become stronger and

not weaker, has exercised more independence of action than before

and, while the administration is happy to describe the policy as

containment, it is fair to observe that what was once a regime inspected

by international inspectors is a regime no longer so inspected.

The inspections that provided the principal means by which we

could judge Saddam’s effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction

has come to an end, despite the fact that the administration’s own

announced goal preceding the bombing campaign against Saddam

was the restoration of inspection programs that were terminated

unilaterally by Saddam.

Saddam posed a clear and unambiguous challenge. We failed to

meet that challenge. If we are able to resume inspections in Iraq,

it will be the product of a negotiation with Saddam himself, and

I cannot help but observe that any inspection regime to which Saddam

agrees and in which he exercises a virtual veto over who is

to do the inspecting and under what circumstances cannot be effective.

Saddam will not agree to an inspection regime that has any reasonable

prospect of uncovering his covert program to acquire weapons

of mass destruction. The fact that he feels free to choose between

this inspector and that, giving the approval to one who he

believes will be pliable in denying approval, to one who he believes

will not, is an indication of how weak and ineffective we have become.

If anyone is in a box, it is not Saddam Hussein. It is the American

administration. Not only has the inspection regime which is

vital to our comprehensive understanding of what programs Saddam

has underway been shattered—even if a reasonable inspection

regime could be put in place we have now, owing to the long period

in which no inspections have taken place, we have lost much of the

data base upon which any reasonable intelligence operation must

be based.

Everything that could be moved has been moved. Whatever

knowledge we once possessed about where to look has now been

taken from us, and we are now back, if we were able to return,

looking for a very small object in a very large territory. The prospects

of success are very limited.

But not only has the inspection regime been shattered; the political

support that has sustained the one constant element of administration

policy, which is the sanctions now in place, has been declining

rapidly. The coalition that was once arrayed against Saddam

is in a shambles. Among the former coalition partners, even

some of our close allies now take the other side and are eager to

see the sanctions lifted. Increasingly the world has come to believe

that the victim of the sanctions is not Saddam Hussein but innocent

civilians, men, women, and children in Iraq.

I think it is very important to be clear on this point. Saddam has

manipulated the perception of the impact of the sanctions and has

it entirely within his power to bring significant relief to the civilian

population of Iraq. Much of the money that has been made available

for humanitarian purposes has not been spent, and will not

be spent, as long as Saddam can prevent it in order to build pressure

against the continuation of the sanctions by creating the impression

that only the elimination of the sanctions can restore

health to Iraqi women and children and deal with the humanitarian

catastrophe that we now see.

So I in no way relieve Saddam Hussein of responsibility for that

humanitarian tragedy, but at the same time I think it is important

to observe that the sanctions themselves are of declining effectiveness.

They are increasingly circumvented. Saddam has found ways

around the sanctions in collaboration with others, including some

of his former enemies.

There is a steady flow of resources into Iraq that are at Saddam’s

disposal. The sanctions, among other things, have actually solidified

his total control over the Iraqi economy, and so no one can

argue that the sanctions are of such force and weight and effectiveness

that we can count on them to bring down Saddam’s regime.

They simply will not, and any belief to the contrary is sadly mistaken.

At any rate, the sanctions will not last forever, because support

for them is eroding, and when they are finally lifted, as they almost

surely will be, Saddam will expect, and with good reason, a political

victory of enormous proportions. He will emerge in the Gulf as

the leader who stood up to the United States and the Western

world and prevailed. At that point I believe the region will be a

much more dangerous place, and the manifest failure of American

and allied policy—and here it is largely a failure of American leadership—

will be evident to everyone.

But by then it will be too late, and I fear that the administration

calculates that too late will come after the next Presidential election.

The evidence is overwhelming that their short-term objective

is to get past the election without a more visible catastrophe, and

that is probably their long-term objective as well.

Mr. Chairman, in contrast to this policy of drift, deterioration,

and ineffectiveness the Congress has—in a series of actions that I

believe are without precedent—empowered the administration to

organize and assist the internal opposition to Saddam Hussein.

As one would expect, a ruler like Saddam Hussein, who rules by

terror, who rules by murder and assassination, has accumulated

over the years a great many enemies. In fact, the number of victims

is so large that they alone would constitute an inchoate revolutionary

force. So the issue for the West in my view is how best

to organize that opposition, to assist it, to forge it into an instrument

by which Saddam’s murderous regime might be brought

down.

The term ‘‘freedom fighters’’ is an entirely appropriate term, and

the Iraqi National Congress has for many years been organized

along lines expressing support for democratic principles. It has

been comprehensively organized, affecting all elements of Iraqi society.

It has deserved and indeed received the support of the Congress

of the United States and, as you well know Mr. Chairman,

as a leader in this effort, the Congress has appropriated money and

other resources to assist the INC.

We should be very clear about the administration’s attitude toward

this approach. It is one of opposition—flat out, unmitigated

opposition—and at every turn the administration has sought to

frustrate the congressional intent by withholding the resources that

you have offered to them to assist the Iraqi National Congress and

even, I am sorry to say, by acting in a manner calculated not to

unite the opposition but even to divide it.

There is very substantial evidence that the administration and

various elements of the executive branch have actually worked to

exploit those differences that one would expect to find in any coalition

group, differences that make it more, not less difficult to

achieve the goals of the Iraq Liberation Act, which is the formation

of a coherent opposition.

I know this because, like others in this small town, I frequently

discuss this matter with officials from the administration, sometimes

in rather formal debate and other times in casual conversation,

and I think I can say to you that I have never had a conversation

with any official in the administration on this matter in which

those officials did not state that they thought the policy reflected

in the Iraq Liberation Act was a mistake, and should not be implemented,

and they have given expression to that conviction by dragging

their feet endlessly, and by failing actually to do what the Iraq

Liberation Act calls upon them to do.

As you rightly observed, in the last 24 hours the Vice President,

candidate for the Presidency, has met with the Iraqi National Congress

and once again made pledges of support to the Iraqi National

Congress.

I do not know whether he took his earlier pledges of support off

the word processor and changed the date, or whether he drafted a

new set of talking points, but I do know that in August 1993 the

same Vice President, who was not then a Presidential candidate,

gave a very full expression of support to the Iraqi National Congress.

That preceded by almost 3 years a military operation by Saddam

against the Iraqi National Congress in which a great many people

working with the United States, and who had placed trust and confidence

in the United States were executed by Saddam Hussein. I

do not recall the Vice President on that occasion taking any action

whatsoever to keep the commitment that was made then.

Hope springs eternal, and maybe this time he means it. But it

is still, it seems to me, a commitment that falls far short of the

kind of vigorous program that would give the policy behind the

Iraq Liberation Act a decent chance for success.

Let me conclude by saying what I think is required in this case.

It is the administration’s conviction that attempting to assist the

INC is unwise, because the INC is incapable of taking on Saddam

Hussein. They are weak and disorganized, according to officials in

the administration, including officials who report directly to the

Vice President and others, always in private in the latter case.

Let me say that all oppositions that lack external support, that

lack a strategy with resources behind it that give it a reasonable

prospect of success, are by definition weak, so it means nothing to

say that an organization lacking the fundamental support it needs

is going to be weak. It is inevitable.

As to the disorganization, I think the INC has come a very long

way in organizing itself and you see in this room a number of representatives

of the INC from all elements of Iraqi society who have

come together in what is a very impressive display of unity.

Now, there are differences, to be sure, and the differences will always

be larger when the prospects of success are smaller. The

point is that it is well within the power of the United States—as

a world leader and as a source of the resources necessary to mount

an effective campaign against Saddam Hussein—to assist this opposition

in a way that will assist its achieving cohesion and effectiveness,

and it is within our power to help them design the plans

by which they can effectively challenge Saddam’s regime.

So the pessimism of the administration, the defeatism of the administration,

the paralysis of the administration is, in fact, a selffulfilling

prophesy. If they say long enough and often enough that

the opposition is weak and divided; if they withhold the support

that the Congress has urged them to extend, then they can, of

course, weaken the opposition and prevent it from achieving reasonable

and attainable objectives.

So I hope very much that we will see a change in administration

policy. It will probably take a new administration to accomplish

that. I would be quite happy to see a new administration in any

case, but one of the reasons for preferring a new administration is

that we look forward to one that implements the law now on the

books that requires support for the liberation of Iraq by those people

who have been willing to run the risks and organize themselves

to bring that about.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Bush has said that we should, and he

would, fully implement the Iraq Liberation Act. I think we all understand

what that means. It means a serious and sustained effort

to assist the opposition with a view to bringing down Saddam’s regime.

I am confident that when the Governor says that would be

his policy, he means what he says.

I came to Washington 31 years ago, and I must say that in that

period I have not seen a sustained hypocrisy that parallels the current

administration’s public embrace of the Iraq Liberation Act and

its dilatory tactics aimed at preventing any progress from taking

place under that act.

That will not be the case in a Bush administration, and I am absolutely

convinced that if the Governor held the view that the current

administration holds, which is one of opposition to the ILA, he

would have the courage of his convictions and state it openly, and

he certainly would not sign into law a piece of legislation that he

had no intention of implementing.

If the administration—the current administration—is now prepared

to change its policy, and I must say it remains to be seen,

there are some things they could do immediately that would be

persuasive. They could begin by reassigning Frank Ricciardone,

who has been designated as the liaison with the Iraqi National

Congress, and who has been engaged principally in the delaying

tactics that have produced the result you just heard about. That is,

2 years and no action. He should be given a useful assignment and

removed from his current position, because nothing is going to happen

under his sponsorship.

Second, the administration could appoint one official, just one at

a senior level who believes in the goals and objectives of the Iraq

Liberation Act and who would honestly seek to implement the law

as the law has been written and approved.

I cannot, as I look through the list of administration officials responsible

for this policy, find a single official who is sympathetic

to the goals and objectives of the Iraq Liberation Act, so we should

not be surprised to find that even these most recent promises disappear

into the upper atmosphere as soon as the spotlight of attention

is removed.

This hearing, and I hope you will hold subsequent hearings, is

very important for focusing attention on these pledges, these promises,

and these commitments. If you are able to do so early in the

fall, I would hope that you could look back and say, now, what has

happened since the last promises were made?

And I hope that this time there will be some real progress to report,

but I must say to you that unless the strategy is to bring

down Saddam by inducing fatal laughter, the idea of training in

civil military relations and the writing of press releases is not the

way to advance the purposes of the Iraq Liberation Act.